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Abstract Current software model checkers quickly reach their limit
when being applied to verifying pointer safety properties in source code
that includes function pointers and inlined assembly. This paper intro-
duces an alternative technique for checking pointer safety violations,
called Symbolic Object Code Analysis (SOCA), which is based on bounded
symbolic execution, incorporates path-sensitive slicing, and employs the
SMT solver Yices as its execution and veriﬁcation engine. Extensive ex-
perimental results of a prototypic SOCA Veriﬁer, using the Verisec suite
and almost 10,000 Linux device driver functions as benchmarks, show
that SOCA performs competitively to current source-code model check-
ers and that it also scales well when applied to real operating systems
code and pointer safety issues. SOCA eﬀectively explores semantic niches
of software that current software veriﬁers do not reach.
Keywords: model checking; symbolic execution; program slicing;
object code analysis; linux device drivers
1 Introduction
One challenge in verifying complex software is the proper analysis of pointer op-
erations. A recent study shows that a majority of errors found in device drivers
involve memory safety [9]. Writing software that is free of memory safety con-
cerns, e.g., free of errors caused by pointers to invalid memory cells, is diﬃcult
since many such issues result in program crashes at later points in execution.
Hence, a statement causing a memory corruption may not be easily identiﬁ-
able using conventional validation and testing tools, e.g., Purify [36] and Val-
grind [33].
Current static veriﬁcation tools, including software model checkers such as
[4,10,12,17], are also not of much help: they either assume that programs do
not have wild pointers [3], perform poorly in the presence of pointers [31], or
simply cannot handle certain software. A particular challenging kind of software
are operating systems (OS) components such as device drivers, which are usually
written in C code involving function pointers, pointer arithmetic and inlined
assembly. Further issues arise because of platform-speciﬁc and compiler-speciﬁc
details concerning memory layout, padding and oﬀsets [2]. In addition, several
approaches to model checking compiled programs given in assembly or bytecode
[6,29,38,40], and also to integrating symbolic execution [23] with model checking
[15,16,22,35,39] have recently been presented. However, these are tailored to
exploit speciﬁc characteristics of certain programming paradigms such as object-
oriented programming, or lack support for data structures, function pointers and
computed jumps, or require substantial manual modelling eﬀort (cf. Sec. 5).
Our contributions presented in this paper are as follows. We introduce a novel,
automated technique to identifying memory safety violations, called Symbolic
Object Code Analysis (SOCA), which is based on the symbolic execution [23]
of compiled and linked programs (cf. Sec. 2). In contrast to other veriﬁcation
techniques, SOCA requires only a minimum of manual modelling eﬀort, namely
the abstract, symbolic speciﬁcation of a program's execution context in terms
of function inputs and initial heap content. The SOCA technique traverses the
program's object code in a systematic fashion up to a certain depth and width,
and calculates at each assembly instruction a slice [41] required for checking the
relevant pointer safety properties. It translates such a slice and properties into
a bit-vector constraint problem and executes the property checks by invoking
the Yices SMT solver [14] (cf. Sec. 3). To the best of our knowledge, SOCA
is the only program veriﬁcation technique available that features full support
for pointer arithmetics, function pointers and computed jumps. While SOCA
is based on existing and well-known techniques, combining and implementing
these for object code analysis is challenging. Much engineering eﬀort went into
our SOCA implementation, so that it scales to complex real-world OS code such
as Linux device drivers. We believe that our experience gained will be helpful for
future developers of program analysis and program veriﬁcation tools (cf. Sec. 3).
The particular combination of techniques in SOCA is well suited for checking
memory safety. Analysing object code is beneﬁcial in that it inherently considers
compiler speciﬁcs such as results of code optimisations, makes memory layout
obvious, and does away with the challenge of handling mixed input languages
involving assembly code. Symbolic execution, rather than the concrete execution
adopted in testing, can handle software functions with many input parameters,
whose values are typically not known at compile time. It is the existence of
eﬃcient SMT solvers that makes the symbolic approach feasible. Symbolic exe-
cution also implies a path-wise exploration, thus reducing the aliasing problem
and allowing us to handle even complex pointer operations and computed jumps.
In addition, slicing can now be conducted at path-level instead of at program-
level, resulting in drastically smaller slices to the extent that abstraction is not
necessary for achieving scalability. However, the price of symbolic execution is
that it must be bounded and can thus only analyse code up to a ﬁnite depth
and width.
Interesting questions regarding the SOCA technique are whether it is compet-
itive to state-of-the-art model checking on programs with well-behaved pointers
such as [4,12,17], and whether it scales when applied to dirty programs such
as device drivers, which cannot be properly analysed with source-code model
checkers. To answer these questions, we have implemented a prototypic SOCA
tool for programs compiled for the 32-bit Intel Architecture (IA32), the SOCA
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Veriﬁer, and performed extensive experiments (cf. Sec. 4). Using the Verisec
benchmark [27] we show that the SOCA Veriﬁer performs on par with the model
checkers LoopFrog [25] and SatAbs [12] with regards to performance, error detec-
tion and false-positive rates. We then apply the SOCA Veriﬁer to 9296 functions
taken from 250 Linux device drivers. Our tool is able to successfully analyse 95%
of these functions and, despite the fact that SOCA performs a bounded analysis,
28% of the functions are analysed exhaustively. Therefore, SOCA proves itself
to be a capable technique when being confronted with checking pointer-complex
software such as OS components. It eﬀectively explores semantic niches that
neither current testing tools nor current software model checkers reach.
2 Pointers, Aliasing & Intermediate Representation
The veriﬁcation technique developed in this paper aims at ensuring that every
pointer in a given program is valid in the sense that it (i) never references a
memory location outside the address space allocated by or for that program,
and (ii) respects the usage rules determined by the Application Programming
Interfaces (APIs) employed by the program. There exist several categories of
memory safety properties  (1) dereferencing invalid pointers: a pointer may
not be NULL, shall be initialised, and shall not point to a memory location out-
side the address space allocated by or for the program; (2) uninitialised reads:
memory cells shall be initialised before they are read; (3) violation of memory
permissions: when the program is loaded into memory, the segments of the pro-
gram ﬁle are assigned with permissions that determine whether a segment can be
read, written or executed; (4) buﬀer overﬂows: out-of-bounds read and write op-
erations to objects on the heap and stack, which may lead to memory corruption
and give way to various security problems; (5) memory leaks: when a program
dynamically allocates memory but loses the handle to it, the memory cannot
be deallocated anymore; (6) proper handling of allocation and deallocation: OSs
usually provide several APIs for the dynamic (de)allocation of memory, whose
documentation speciﬁes precisely what pairs of functions are to be employed
how.
01 #include <stdio.h>
02 #include <sys/types.h>
03
04 int main (void) {
05 int32_t i, *p2=&i;
06 int16_t *p1=&((int16_t*) &i)[0];
07
08 for (*p1=0; *p1<10; (*p1)++)
09 { *p2=0; }
10
11 printf ("%08x: %d\n", p1, *p1);
12 printf ("%08x: %d\n", p2, *p2);
13 printf ("%08x: %d\n", &i, i);
14 return (0); }
Figure 1. Example of pointer aliasing in C: e_loop.c.
Aliasing in source code and object code. Amajor issue for analysing pointer
programs is aliasing. Aliasing means that a data location in memory may be ac-
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cessed through diﬀerent symbolic names. Since aliasing relations between sym-
bolic names and data locations often arise unexpectedly during program exe-
cution, they may result in erroneous program behaviours that are particularly
hard to trace and debug. To illustrate this, the C program given in Fig. 1 shows
a complicated way of implementing an endless loop.
$ gcc -O2 e_loop.c
$ ./a.out
bfc76f2c: 10
bfc76f2c: 0
bfc76f2c: 0
$ gcc -O2 e_loop.c
$ ./a.out
bfc7428c: 10
bfc7428c: 10
bfc7428c: 10
$ gcc -O1 e_loop.c
$ ./a.out
-> does not terminate
Figure 2. Output of the program given in Fig. 1 when compiled with (a) gcc version
4.1.2 (left) and (b,c) gcc version 4.3.1 (middle and right).
80483ba: xor %eax,%eax ;; eax := 0;
80483c4: lea -0xc(%ebp),%ebx ;; ebx := ebp - 0xc
80483c8: add $0x1,%eax ;; eax := eax + 0x00000001
80483cb: cmp $0x9,%ax ;; (ax = 9)?
80483cf: movl $0x0,-0xc(%ebp) ;; *p2 (= ebp - 0xc) := 0
80483d6: mov %ax,(%ebx) ;; *p1 (= ebx = ebp - 0xc) := ax
80483d9: jle 80483c8 ;; if (ax <= 9) goto 80483c8
Figure 3. Excerpt of the disassembled program compiled in Fig. 2(b).
As depicted in Fig. 2, three diﬀerent outcomes of the program's execution
can occur as a result of varying assumptions made about pointer aliasing by
the developer and the compiler, as well as compiler optimisations applied to the
code. More surprises are revealed when studying the excerpt of the corresponding
assembly code displayed in Fig. 3, which was obtained by disassembling the
program that produced the output shown in Fig. 2(b). One can see at instructions
80483cf and 80483d6 that p1 and p2 are pointing to the same location in memory,
and that *p2 is actually written before *p1. This is unexpected when looking at
the program's source code but valid from the compiler's point of view, since it
assumes that the two pointers are pointing to diﬀerent data objects. As another
consequence of this assumption, register eax is never reloaded from the memory
location to which p1 and p2 point.
This example shows that source-code-based analysis has to decide for a par-
ticular semantics of the source language, which may not be the one that is used
by a compiler. Hence, results obtained by analysing the source code may not
meet a program's runtime behaviour. While this motivates the analysis of com-
piled programs, doing so does not provide a generic solution for dealing with
pointer aliasing, as aliasing relationships may depend on runtime conditions.
Intermediate representation. A program under analysis is stored by us in
an intermediate representation (IR) borrowed from Valgrind [33], a framework
for dynamic binary instrumentation. The IR consists of a set of basic blocks
containing a group of statements such that all transfers of control to the block
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are to the ﬁrst statement in the group. Once the block has been entered, all of
its statements are executed sequentially until an exit statement is reached. An
exit is always denoted as goto <target>, where <target> is either a constant
or a temporary register that determines the next program location to be exe-
cuted. Guarded jumps are written as if (<condition>) goto <target>, where
<condition> is a temporary register of type boolean, which has previously been
assigned within the basic block.
IA32 Assembly IR Instructions
xor %eax,%eax t9 = GET:I32(0) ;; t9 := eax
t8 = GET:I32(0) ;; t8 := eax
t7 = Xor32(t9,t8) ;; t7 := t9 xor t8
PUT(0) = t7 ;; eax := t7
lea -0xc(%ebp),%ebx t42 = GET:I32(20)
t41 = Add32(t42,0xFFFFFFF4:I32)
PUT(12) = t41
Figure 4. First two instructions of Fig. 3 and their respective IR instructions.
Fig. 4 depicts an example for assembly statements and their corresponding
IR statements. It shows how, e.g., the xor statement is decomposed into explic-
itly loading (GET) the source register 0 into the temporary registers t8 and t9,
performing the xor operation into the temporary register t7, followed by storing
(PUT) the result back to the guest state. All operands used in the ﬁrst block of
the example are 4 bytes, or 32 bits, in size.
As can be seen, the IR is essentially a typed assembly language in static-
single-assignment form [28], and employs temporary registers, which are denoted
as t<n>, and the guest state. The guest state consists of the contents of the
registers that are available in the architecture for which the program under
analysis is compiled. While machine registers are always 8 bits long, temporary
registers may be 1, 8, 16, 32 or 64 bits in length. As a result of this, statement t9
= GET:I32(0) means that t9 is generated by concatenating machine registers
0 to 3. Since each IR block is in static-single-assignment form with respect to
the temporary registers, t9 is assigned only once within a single IR block. As a
valuable feature for analysing pointer safety, Valgrind's IR makes all load and
store operations to memory cells explicit.
3 SOCA  Symbolic Object Code Analysis
This section introduces our novel approach to verifying memory safety in com-
piled and linked programs, to which we refer as Symbolic Object Code Analysis
(SOCA). The basic idea behind our approach employs well-known techniques
including symbolic execution [23], SMT solving [26] and program slicing [41].
However, combining these ideas and implementing them in a way that scales
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to real applications, such as Linux device drivers, is challenging and the main
contribution of this paper.
Starting from a program's given entry point, we automatically translate each
instruction of the program's object code into Valgrind's IR language. This is done
lazily, i.e., as needed, by iteratively following each program path in a depth-ﬁrst
fashion and resolving target addresses of computed jumps and return statements.
We then generate systems of bit-vector constraints for the path under analysis,
which reﬂect the path-relevant register content and heap content of the pro-
gram. In this process we employ a form of program slicing, called path-sensitive
and heap-aware program slicing (cf. p. 8), which is key to SOCA's scalability
and makes program abstraction unnecessary. Finally, we invoke the SMT solver
Yices [14] to check the satisﬁability of the resulting constraint systems and thus
the validity of the path. This approach allows us to instrument the constraint
systems on-the-ﬂy as necessary, by adding constraints that express, e.g., whether
a pointer points to an allocated address.
SOCA leaves most of a program's input and initial heap content unspeciﬁed
in order to allow the SMT solver to search for subtle inputs that may reveal
pointer errors. Obviously, our analysis by symbolic execution cannot be com-
plete: the search space has to be bounded since the total number of execution
paths and the number of instructions per path may be inﬁnite. Our experimental
results (cf. Sec 4) show that this boundedness is not a restriction in practice:
many interesting programs, such as Linux device driver functions, are relatively
shallow and may still be analysed either exhaustively or to an acceptable ex-
tent.
Translating IR into Yices constraints. To translate IR statements into
bit-vector constraint systems for Yices, we have deﬁned a simple operational
semantics for Valgrind's IR language. Due to space constraints we cannot present
this semantics here and refer the reader to [30] instead. Instead, we focus directly
on examples illustrating this translation.
As a ﬁrst example we consider the PUT(0) = t7 statement from Fig. 4. Intu-
itively, the semantics of PUT is to store the value held by t7 to the guest state,
in register 0 to 3 (i.e., r0 to r3 below):
IR Instruction Constraint Representation
PUT(0) = t7 (define r0::(bitvector 8)(bv-extract 31 24 t7))
(define r1::(bitvector 8)(bv-extract 23 16 t7))
(define r2::(bitvector 8)(bv-extract 15 8 t7))
(define r3::(bitvector 8)(bv-extract 7 0 t7))
Here, the bv-extract operation denotes bit-vector extraction. Note that the
IA32 CPU registers are assigned in reverse byte order, while arithmetic expres-
sions in Yices are implemented for bit-vectors that have their most signiﬁcant
bit at position 0. Since access operations to the guest state may be 8, 16, 32
or 64 bit aligned, we have to translate the contents of temporary register when
accessing the guest state.
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Similar to the PUT instruction, we can express GET, i.e., loading a value
from the guest state, as the concatenation of bit-vectors, and the Xor and Add
instructions in terms of bit-vector arithmetic:
IR Instruction Constraint Representation
t9 = GET:I32(0) (define t9::(bitvector 32) (bv-concat
(bv-concat r3 r2) (bv-concat r1 r0))
t7 = Xor32(t9,t8) (define t7::(bitvector 32) (bv-xor t9 t8))
t41 = Add32(t42,
0xFFFFFFF4:I32)
(define t88::(bitvector 32)
(bv-add t87 (mk-bv 32 4294967284)
More challenging to implement are the IR instructions ST (store) and LD
(load) which facilitate memory access. The main diﬀerence of these instructions
to PUT and GET is that the target of ST and the source of LD are variable and
may only be computed at runtime. To include these statements in our framework
we have to express them in a ﬂexible way, so that the SMT solver can identify
cases in which safety properties are violated. In Yices we declare a function heap
as our representation of the program's memory. An exemplary ST statement
ST(t5) = t32 can be expressed in terms of updates of that function:
IR Instruction Constraint Representation
ST(t5) = t32 (define heap::(-> (bitvector 32) (bitvector 8)))
(define heap.0::(-> (bitvector 32) (bitvector 8))
(update heap ((bv-add t5 (mk-bv 32 3)))
(bv-extract 7 0 t32)))
(define heap.1::(-> (bitvector 32) (bitvector 8))
(update heap.0 ((bv-add t5 (mk-bv 32 2)))
(bv-extract 15 8 t32)))
(define heap.2::(-> (bitvector 32) (bitvector 8))
(update heap.1 ((bv-add t5 (mk-bv 32 1)))
(bv-extract 23 16 t32)))
(define heap.3::(-> (bitvector 32) (bitvector 8))
(update heap.2 ((bv-add t5 (mk-bv 32 0)))
(bv-extract 31 24 t32)))
Since the above ST instruction stores the content of a 32-bit variable in four
separate 8-bit memory cells, we have to perform four updates of heap. Byte-
ordering conventions apply in the same way as explained for PUT. Constraints
for the LD instruction are generated analogous to GET.
Encoding pointer safety assertions. Being able to translate each object
code instruction into constraints allows us to express the safety pointer properties
given in Sec. 2 in terms of assertions within the constraint systems. The simplest
case of such an assertion is a null-pointer check. For the ST instruction in the
above example, we state this assertion as (assert (= t5 (mk-bv 32 0))).
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If the resulting constraint system is satisﬁable, Yices will return a possible
assignment to the constraint system variables representing the program's input.
This input is constructed such that it will drive the program into a state in which
t5 holds the value null at the above program point.
However, many memory safety properties require additional information to
be known about the program's current execution context. In particular, answer-
ing the question whether a pointer may point to an invalid memory area re-
quires us to know which cells are currently allocated. We retain this information
by adding a function named heaploc to our memory representation:
(define heaploc::(-> (bitvector 32) (record alloc::bool init::bool
start::(bitvector 32) size::(bitvector 32))))
This allows us to express assertions stating that, e.g., pointer t5 has to point
to an allocated address at the program location where it is dereferenced, as:
(assert (= (select (heaploc t5) alloc) false))
All other pointer safety properties mentioned in Sec. 2 may be encoded along
the lines of those two examples. Most of them require further additional infor-
mation to be added to the heaploc function. To reduce the size and search space
of the resulting constraint systems we check assertions one-by-one with a spe-
cialised heaploc function for each property. The full details on our generation of
constraint systems can be found in [30].
Path-sensitive slicing. To ensure scalability of our SOCA technique, we do
not run Yices on an entire path's constraint system. Instead we compute a slice
[41] of the constraint system containing only those constraints that are relevant
to the property to be checked at a particular program location.
The approach to path-sensitive program slicing in SOCA employs an algo-
rithm based on system dependence graphs as introduced in [19]. Our slices are
computed using conventional slicing criteria (L, var) denoting a variable var
that is used at program location L, but over the single path currently being
analysed instead of the program's entire control ﬂow. The slice is then com-
puted by collecting all statements on which var is data dependent by tracing
the path backwards, starting from L up to the program entry point. While col-
lecting ﬂow dependencies is relatively easy for programs that do only use CPU
registers and temporary registers, it becomes diﬃcult when dependencies to the
heap and stack are involved.
Handling memory access in slicing. Consider the following two IR state-
ments: 01 ST(t5) = t32; 02 t31 = LD:I32(t7). To compute a slice for the
slicing criterion (02, t31) we have to know whether the store statement ST may
aﬀect the value of t31, i.e., whether t5 and t7 may alias. We obtain this infor-
mation by using Yices to iteratively compute the potential address range that
can be accessed via t5. This is done by making Yices ﬁnd a satisfying model e
for t5. When reading a model, which is represented by Yices by a bit-vector, we
compute its integer representation. We then compute further satisfying models
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e′ such that e > e′ or e < e′ holds, until the range is explored. The compu-
tation is done by stepwise adding or retracting constraints so as to use Yices
as eﬃciently as possible. However, sometimes complex constraint systems arise
that require the power and eﬃciency of modern SAT solvers. Since we remember
only the maximal and minimal satisfying models for a given pointer, this is an
over-approximation as not the entire address range may be addressable by that
pointer. However, using this abstraction presents a trade-oﬀ concerning only the
size of the computed slices and not their correctness, and helps us to keep the
number of Yices runs and the amount of data to be stored small.
By computing the potential address range accessed by a pointer used in a
load statement, e.g., t7 in our case, and looking for memory intervals overlapping
with the range of t7, we can now determine which store operations may aﬀect
the result of the load operation. Despite being conservative when computing
address ranges, our experience shows that most memory access operations end
up having few dependencies; this is because most pointers evaluate to a concrete
value, i.e., the constraint system has exactly one satisfying model, rather than a
symbolic value.
Handling computed jumps. A major challenge when analysing compiled
programs arises from the extensive use of function pointers and jump target
computations. While most source-code-based approaches simply ignore function
pointers [4,12,17], this cannot be done when analysing object code since jump
computations are too widely deployed here. The most common example for a
computed jump is the return statement after a function call. To perform a re-
turn, the bottom element of the stack is loaded into a temporary register, e.g.,
t1, followed by a goto t1 statement, which eﬀectively sets the value of the pro-
gram counter to t1. Further examples for computed jumps are jump tables and
function pointers.
In our approach, jump target addresses are determined in the same way as
addresses for load and store operations, i.e., by computing a slice for each jump
target and then using Yices to determine satisfying models for the target register.
Optimising GET and PUT statements. A problem with respect to the
scalability of our approach arises from the vast number of GET and PUT state-
ments in IR code. In particular, the frequent de-/re-composing of word-aligned
temporary registers into guest registers and back into temporary registers in-
troduces lots of additional variables in the SMT solver. These GET and PUT
statements are introduced into our IR in order to make the IR block generated
for a single CPU instruction reentrant with respect to the guest state. Thereby
we avoid the need to repeat the translation from object code to IR whenever an
instruction is used in a diﬀerent execution context, at the expense of having to
deal with larger constraint systems.
An eﬃcient way around this issue is to optimise unnecessary GET and PUT
operations away, based on a reaching deﬁnition analysis for a given register and
path. Practical results show that this simple optimisation greatly reduces the
memory consumption of Yices for large constraint systems. We can apply the
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same optimisations to memory accesses in cases where the address arguments
to LD and ST evaluate to constant values. From our experience, dealing with
unnecessary GET, PUT, LD and ST statements, by performing the above op-
timisations on IR level for an entire execution path, results in more eﬃcient
constraint systems and shorter runtimes of SOCA and Yices than by allowing
Valgrind to perform similar optimisations at basic-block level.
Determining a valid initial memory state. Another challenge when imple-
menting symbolic execution as an SMT problem is given by the enormous search
space that may result from leaving the program's initial memory state undeﬁned.
OS components, including functions taken from device drivers, make regularly
use of an external data environment consisting of heap objects allocated and
initialised by other modules of the OS. Hence, this data environment cannot be
inferred from the information available in the program binary. In practice, data
environments can often be embedded into our analysis without much eﬀort, by
adding a few lines of C code as a preamble, as is shown in [32].
4 Experimental Results
To evaluate our SOCA technique regarding its ability to identify pointer safety
issues and to judge its performance when analysing OS components, we have
implemented SOCA in a prototypic tool, the SOCA Veriﬁer. The tool comprises
15,000 lines of C code and took about one person-year to build; details of its ar-
chitecture can be found in [30]. This section reports on the extensive experiments
we conducted in applying the SOCA Veriﬁer to a benchmark suite for software
model checkers and to a large set of Linux device drivers. All experiments were
carried out on a 16-core PC with 2.3 GHz clock speed and 256 GB of RAM,
running 16 instances of the SOCA Veriﬁer in parallel. However, an oﬀ-the-shelf
PC with 4 GB of RAM is suﬃcient for everyday use, when one must not verify
thousands of programs concurrently to meet a deadline.
4.1 Experiments I: The Verisec Benchmark
To enable a qualitative comparison of the SOCA Veriﬁer to other tools, we
applied it to the Verisec benchmark [27]. Verisec consists of 298 test programs
(149 faulty programs  positive test programs  and 149 corresponding ﬁxed
programs  negative test programs) for buﬀer overﬂow vulnerabilities, taken from
various open source programs. These test cases are given in terms of C source
code which we compiled into object code using gcc, and provide a conﬁgurable
buﬀer size which we set to 4. The bounds for the SOCA Veriﬁer were set to a
maximum of 100 paths to be analysed, where a single instruction may appear at
most 500 times per path. Yices was conﬁgured to a timeout of 300 seconds per
invocation. Of these bounds, only the timeout for Yices was ever reached.
In previous work [25,27], Verisec was used to evaluate the C-code model
checkers SatAbs [12] and LoopFrog [25]. To enable a transparent comparison, we
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Table 1. Comparison of SatAbs, LoopFrog and SOCA
R(d) R(f) R(¬f |d)
SatAbs (from [27]) 0.36 0.08 n/a
LoopFrog (from [25]) 1.0 0.26 0.74
SOCA 0.66 0.23 0.81
adopt the metrics proposed in [45]: in Table 1 we report the detection rate R(d),
the false-positive rate R(f), and the discrimination rate R(¬f |d). The latter is
deﬁned as the ratio of positive test cases for which an error is correctly reported,
plus the negative test case for which the error is correctly not reported, to all
test cases. Hence, tools are penalised for not ﬁnding bugs and for not reporting
a sound program as safe.
Figure 5. Performance results for the Verisec benchmark. (a) Numbers of test cases
veriﬁed by time (left). (b) Numbers of constraint systems solved by time (right).
As Table 1 testiﬁes, the SOCA Veriﬁer reliably detects the majority of buﬀer
overﬂow errors in the benchmark, and has a lower false-positive rate and a bet-
ter discrimination rate than the other tools. Remarkable is also that the SOCA
Veriﬁer failed for only 4 cases of the Verisec suite: once due to memory exhaus-
tion and three times due to missing support for certain IR instructions in our
tool. Only, our detection rate is lower than the one reported for LoopFrog. An
explanation for this is the nature of Verisec's test cases where static arrays are
declared globally. This program setup renders Verisec easily comprehensible for
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source-code veriﬁcation tools since the bounds of data objects are clearly identi-
ﬁable in source code. In object code, however, the boundaries of data objects are
not visible anymore. This makes the SOCA Veriﬁer less eﬀective when analysing
programs with small, statically declared buﬀers.
Hence, despite having used a benchmark providing examples which are in
favour of source code analysis, our results show that object code analysis, as im-
plemented in the SOCA Veriﬁer, can compete with state-of-the-art source-code
model checkers. However, as our tool analyses object code, it can be employed in
a much wider application domain. Unfortunately, benchmarks that include dy-
namic allocation and provide examples of pointer safety errors other than buﬀer
overﬂows are, to the best of our knowledge, not available.
Table 2. Performance statistics for the Verisec suite
average standard min max total
deviation
per test case
total runtime 18m30s 1h33m 162ms 15h21m 91h54m
slicing time 28s150ms 41s808ms 28ms 5m15s 2h19m
Yices time 17m59s 1h33m 110ms 15h20m 89h19m
no. of CS 4025.11 173.76 11 8609 11994834
pointer operations 8.73 37.74 4 242 2603
per Yices invocation
runtime 267ms 4s986ms 1ms 5m 88h59m
CS size 891.64 7707.95 0 368087
memory usage 6.82MB 46.54MB 3.81MB 2504.36MB
Fig. 5(a) gives details on run times; it shows the CPU times consumed for
analysing each test cases in the Verisec benchmark. The vast majority of test
cases is analysed by the SOCA Veriﬁer within less than three minutes per case.
As presented in Table 2, the average computation time consumed per test case is
18.5 minutes. In total, about 92 CPU hours were used. The memory consumption
of both, the SOCA Veriﬁer and Yices together, ammounts to an average of only
140 MBytes and a maximum of about 3 GBytes, which is a memory capacity
that is typically available in today's PCs. Notably, Ku reported in [27] that
the SatAbs tool crashed in 73 cases and timed out in another 87 cases with a
timeout of 30 minutes. The runtime of the SOCA Veriﬁer exceeds this time in
only 7 cases.
In Fig. 5(b) we show the behaviour of Yices for solving the constraint sys-
tems generated by the SOCA Veriﬁer. For the Verisec suite, a total of 11,994,834
constraint systems were solved in 89 hours. 2,250,878 (19%) of these constraint
systems express veriﬁcation properties, while the others were required for com-
puting control ﬂow, e.g., for deciding branching conditions and resolving com-
puted jumps. With the timeout for Yices set to 5 minutes, the solver timed out
on 34 constraint systems, and 96% of the constraint systems were solved in less
than one second. Thus, the SOCA Veriﬁer's performance is on par with state-
of-the-art software model checkers. Especially, it is eﬃcient enough to be used
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as an automated debugging tool by software developers, both regarding time
eﬃciency and space eﬃciency.
4.2 Experiments II: Linux Device Drivers
To evaluate the scalability of the SOCA Veriﬁer, a large set of 9296 functions
originating from 250 Linux device drivers of version 2.6.26 of the Linux kernel
compiled for IA32 was analysed by us. Our experiments employ the Linux utility
nm to obtain a list of function symbols present in a device driver. By statically
linking the driver to the Linux kernel we resolved undeﬁned symbols in the driver,
i.e., functions provided by the OS kernel that are called by the driver's functions.
The SOCA technique was then applied on the resulting binary ﬁle to analyse
each of the driver's functions separately. The bounds for the SOCA Veriﬁer were
set to a maximum of 1000 paths to be analysed, where a single instruction may
appear at most 1000 times per path, thereby eﬀectively bounding the number of
loop iterations or recursions to that depth. Moreover, Yices was conﬁgured to a
timeout of 300 seconds per invocation.
Table 3. Performance statistics for the Linux device drivers
average standard min max total
deviation
per test case
total runtime 58m28s 7h56m 21ms 280h48m 9058h32m
slicing time 8m35s 2h13m 0 95h39m 1329h46m
Yices time 48m36s 7h28m 0 280h30m 7531h51m
no. of CS 3591.14 9253.73 0 53449 33383239
pointer operations 99.53 312.64 0 4436 925277
no. of paths 67.50 221.17 1 1000 627524
max path lengths 727.22 1819.28 1 22577
per Yices invocation
runtime 845ms 8s765ms 1ms 5m2s 8295h56m
CS size 4860.20 20256.77 0 7583410
Memory usage 5.75MB 14.76MB 3.81MB 3690.00MB
Our obtained results are summarised in Table 3 and show that 94.4% of the
functions in our sample could be analysed by the SOCA Veriﬁer. In 67.5% of
the functions the exhaustion of execution bounds led to an early termination of
the analysis. However, the analysis reached a considerable depth even in those
cases, analysing paths of lengths of up to 22,577 CPU instructions. Interestingly,
27.8% of the functions could be analysed exhaustively, where none of the bounds
regarding the number of paths, the path lengths, or the SMT solver's timeout
were reached. As depicted in Fig. 6(a), the SOCA Veriﬁer returns a result in less
than 10 mins in the majority of cases, while the generated constraint systems
were usually solved in less than 500 ms. The timeout for Yices was hardly ever
reached (cf. Fig. 6(b)).
As an aside, it should be mentioned that in 0.98% (91 functions) of the sample
Linux driver functions, the SOCA Veriﬁer may have produced unsound results
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Figure 6. Performance results for the Linux device drivers. (a) Numbers of test cases
veriﬁed by time (left). (b) Numbers of constraint systems solved by time (right).
due to non-linear arithmetic within the generated constraint systems, which
is not decidable by Yices. In addition, our veriﬁer failed in 5.6% of the cases
(522 functions) due to either memory exhaustion, missing support for particular
assembly instructions in our tool or Valgrind, or crashes of Yices.
Our evaluation shows that the SOCA Veriﬁer scales to real-world OS software
while delivering very good performance. Being automatic and not restricted to
analysing programs available in source code only, the SOCA Veriﬁer is an eﬃ-
cient tool that is capable of aiding a practitioner in debugging pointer-complex
software such as OS components. The application of the SOCA Veriﬁer is, how-
ever, not restricted to verifying memory safety. In [32] we presented a case study
on retrospective veriﬁcation of the Linux Virtual File System (VFS) using the
SOCA Veriﬁer for checking violations of API usage rules such as deadlocks caused
by misuse of the Linux kernel's spinlock API.
5 Related Work
A survey on automated techniques for formal software veriﬁcation can be found
in [13]. By having the potential of being exhaustive and fully automatic, model
checking, in combination with abstraction and reﬁnement, is a successful tech-
nique used in software veriﬁcation [11].
Model checking bytecode and assembly languages. In recent years, sev-
eral approaches to model checking compiled programs by analysing bytecode
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and assembly code have been presented. In [40], Java PathFinder (JPF ) for
model checking Java bytecode is introduced. JPF generates the state space of
a program by monitoring a virtual machine. Model checking is then conducted
on the states explored by the virtual machine, employing collapsing techniques
and symmetry reduction for eﬃciently storing states and reducing the size of the
state space. These techniques are eﬀective because of the high complexity of JPF
states and the speciﬁc characteristics of the Java memory model. In contrast,
the SOCA technique to verifying object code involves relatively simple states
and, in diﬀerence to Java, the order of data within memory is important in IA32
object code. Similar to JPF, StEAM [29] model checks bytecode compiled for
the Internet C Virtual Machine.
BTOR [6] and [mc]square [34,38] are tools for model checking assembly code
for micro-controllers. They accept assembly code as their input, which may ei-
ther be obtained during compilation of a program or, as suggested in [38], by
disassembling a binary program. As shown in [18], the problem of disassembling
a binary program is undecidable in general. The SOCA technique focuses on
the veriﬁcation of binary programs without the requirement of disassembling a
program at once.
All the above tools are explicit model checkers that require a program's entire
control ﬂow to be known in advance of the analysis. As we have explained above,
this is not feasible in the presence of computed jumps. The SOCA technique has
been especially designed to deal with OS components that make extensive use
of jump computations.
Combining model checking with symbolic execution. Symbolic execution
was introduced by King [23] as a means of improving program testing by cov-
ering a large class of normal executions with one execution, in which symbols
representing arbitrary values are used as input to the program. This is exactly
what our SOCA technique does, albeit not for testing but for systematic, pow-
erful memory safety analysis. A recent approach using symbolic execution to
derive inputs that make a given program crash has been proposed in EXE [7].
In contrast to our work, EXE relies on manual annotations, is not focused on
memory safety, and works at source code level.
Several frameworks for integrating symbolic execution with model checking
have recently been presented, including Symbolic JPF [35] and DART [16]. Sym-
bolic JPF is a successor of the previously mentioned JPF. DART implements
directed and automated random testing to generate test drivers and harness
code to simulate a program's environment. The tool accepts C programs and
automatically extracts function interfaces from source code. Such an interface is
used to seed the analysis with a well-formed random input, which is then mu-
tated by collecting and negating path constraints while symbolically executing
the program. Unlike the SOCA Veriﬁer, DART handles constraints on integer
types only and does not support pointers and data structures.
A language agnostic tool in the spirit of DART is SAGE [15], which is used
internally at Microsoft. SAGE works at IA32 instruction level, tracks integer
constraints as bit-vectors, and employs machine-code instrumentation in a sim-
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ilar fashion as we do in [32]. SAGE is seeded with a well-formed program input
and explores the program space with respect to that input. Branches in the con-
trol ﬂow are explored by negating path constraints collected during the initial
execution. This diﬀers from our approach since SOCA does not require seed-
ing but explores the program space automatically from a given starting point.
The SOCA technique eﬀectively computes program inputs for all paths explored
during symbolic execution.
A bounded model checker for C source code based on symbolic execution
and SAT solving is SATURN [43]. This tool is specialised on checking locking
properties and null-pointer de-references and is thus not as general as SOCA.
The authors show that their tool scales for analysing the entire Linux kernel.
Unlike the SOCA Veriﬁer, the approach in [43] computes function summaries
instead of adding the respective code to the control ﬂow, unwinds loops a ﬁxed
number of times and does not handle recursion.
Concolic testing. An area of research closely related to ours is that of concolic
testing [22,39]. This technique relies on performing concrete execution on random
inputs while collecting path constraints along executed paths. The constraints
are then used to compute new inputs driving the program along alternative
paths. In diﬀerence to this approach, SOCA uses symbolic execution to explore
all paths or, at least orders of magnitude more paths, and concretises only for
resolving computed jumps.
Program slicing. An important SOCA ingredient other than symbolic exe-
cution is path-sensitive slicing. Program slicing was introduced by Weiser [41]
as a technique for automatically selecting only those parts of a program that
may aﬀect the values of interest computed at some point of interest. Diﬀerent
to conventional slicing, our slices are computed over a single path instead of an
entire program, similar to what has been introduced as dynamic slicing in [24]
and path slicing in [20]. In contrast to those approaches, we use conventional
slicing criteria and leave a program's input initially unspeciﬁed. In addition,
while collecting program dependencies is relatively easy at source code level, it
becomes diﬃcult at object code level when dependencies to the heap and stack
are involved. The technique employed by SOCA for dealing with the program's
heap and stack is an variation of the recency abstraction described in [1].
Alternative approaches. Alternative, recent approaches to proving memory
safety are shape analysis [42] and separation logic [37]. All recent work in this
area [21,8] is based on analysing the source code of a program, and calls to li-
brary functions and programming constructs such as function pointers are simply
abstracted using non-deterministic assignments.
Techniques applying theorem proving to verify object code and assembly
code are presented in [5,44]. In [5] the Nqthm prover is employed for reasoning
about the functional correctness of implementations of well-known algorithms.
[44] proposes a logic-based type system for concurrent assembly code and uses
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the Coq proof assistant to verify programs. In contrast to our work, both tech-
niques do not support higher-order code pointers, including return pointers in
procedure calls.
Testing pointer safety. Finally, validation and testing tools such as Purify [36]
and Valgrind [33] must be mentioned since they have been applied successfully
to identifying memory safety problems in application software, rather than OS
software. They execute an instrumented version of a given program in a pro-
tected environment in which various invalid pointer operations can be detected.
However, they are meant for manual testing and do not provide means for au-
tomatically, and potentially exhaustively, exploring all program behaviour.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
This paper presented the novel SOCA technique for automatically checking mem-
ory safety of pointer-complex software. Analysing object code allows us to handle
software, e.g., OS software, which is written in a mix of C and inlined assembly.
Together with SOCA's symbolic execution, this simpliﬁes pointer analysis when
being confronted with function pointers, computed jumps and pointer aliasing.
SOCA achieves scalability by adopting path-sensitive slicing and the eﬃcient
SMT solver Yices. While the SOCA ingredients are well-known, the way in which
we integrated these for automated object code analysis is novel. Much eﬀort went
into engineering our SOCA Veriﬁer, and extensive benchmarking showed that
it performs on par with state-of-the-art software model checkers and scales well
when applied to Linux device driver functions. Our veriﬁer explores semantic
niches of software, especially OS software, which current model checkers and
testing tools do not reach.
Future work shall be pursued along several orthogonal lines. Firstly, since
device driver functions may be invoked concurrently, we plan to extend SOCA
to handle concurrency. To the best of our knowledge, the veriﬁcation of concur-
rent programs with full pointer arithmetic and computed jumps is currently not
supported by any automated veriﬁcation tool. Secondly, we intend to evaluate
diﬀerent search strategies for exploring the paths of a program, employing heuris-
tics based on, e.g., coverage criteria. Thirdly, as some inputs of device drivers
functions involve pointered data structures, we wish to explore whether shape
analysis can inform SOCA in a way that reduces the number of false positives
raised. Fourthly, the SOCA Veriﬁer shall be interfaced to the gnu debugger so
that error traces can be played back in a user-friendly form, at source code level.
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